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 Introduction 
 
Price discrimination is a business practice which has received a lot of attention by 
economists. However, the analysis has been addressed for a long time toward monopoly 
price discrimination. Only from the second half of the Eighties, the implications of price 
discrimination have been investigated in oligopolistic settings. Notwithstanding the 
progress in this field, many interactions of price discrimination in oligopolistic markets 
are still to be understood. The aim of this thesis is to contribute from a theoretical point 
of view to the economic understanding of price discrimination in spatial oligopolies.  
The thesis is composed by three chapters. In Chapter 1, we provide a selective survey of 
the main contributions regarding price discrimination and product differentiation in the 
Hotelling framework. The contributions surveyed in Chapter 1 can be classified into 
two broad categories: a group of papers studies the implications of price discrimination 
in spatial oligopoly, while another group of papers studies the relationship between 
product differentiation and sustainability of collusion. The first group of contributions 
emphasizes that: i) price discrimination tends to decrease equilibrium prices with 
respect to uniform price regime; ii) firms are usually trapped into a Prisoner Dilemma, 
since the dominant strategy for each firm is to price discriminate, but the equilibrium 
profits are lower that under uniform pricing. The second chapter of this thesis 
investigates further on these issues. The second group of contributions shows that 
collusion in easier to sustain the more the firms are differentiated. In general, these 
papers do not allow for price discrimination: in the third chapter of this thesis we 
consider the case of price discrimination.  
In Chapter 2, by using the Hotelling duopoly, we study the firms’ incentive to price 
discriminate when the product differentiation degree is endogenous. Two different 
versions of a three-stage game are considered. In the first version, firms first 
simultaneously choose which variety to produce, then they choose whether to price 
discriminate or not, then they set the price schedules. The Prisoner Dilemma arises: 
firms price discriminate and profits are lower than under uniform pricing. In the second 
version of the game, firms first choose the pricing policy and then they choose the 
variety. Interestingly, in this case the equilibrium is characterized by uniform pricing 
and no Prisoner Dilemma exists. This is due to the emerging of a product differentiation 
 effect: the possibility to price discriminate induces a lower product differentiation 
degree, which in turn increases the competition between firms and makes price 
discrimination less attractive for each firm.  
In Chapter 3, we extend the traditional analysis of the relationship between product 
differentiation and sustainability of collusion within the Hotelling framework to the case 
in which firms may price discriminate. Three different collusive schemes are studied: 
optimal collusion on discriminatory prices, optimal collusion on a uniform price, and 
collusion not to discriminate. The analysis yields the following results. The 
sustainability of the first and the third collusive scheme does not depend on the product 
differentiation degree. Instead, contrary to the traditional findings, the sustainability of 
the second collusive scheme depends negatively on the product differentiation degree. 
We consider also the possibility that firms collude on a suboptimal discriminatory price 
schedule and on a suboptimal uniform price. In both cases if optimal collusion is not 
sustainable, suboptimal collusion is not sustainable too
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